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Tel: +44 1492 879813 Mob: +44 7984 284642 email: andy.brazier@gmail.com |
interactive CV |
Andy Brazier's CV | ||
Project list for 2007 | ||
| 2007 Critical task identification | ||
| Gas | ||
During a previous piece of work Andy commented that the client lacked a robust system for procedures, training and competence. As a result he was invited to return to site to develop a detailed plan of how to proceed. Andy propossed that a full list of operational tasks ranked according to criticality would be the best way to start and proceeded to develop this with site personnel. Using a modest number of assessment criteria, Andy was able to create a spreadsheet that automated the criticality ranking and also suggested the optimum solution for managing risks through use of detailed procedures, job aids, on the job training, more formal method of training and competency assessment. As a result the client had a very good idea of exactly what they needed to do to develop an effective system, and was able to demonstrate an approach based on process risk and human factors principles. | ||
| 2007 Alarm management | ||
| Gas | ||
As part of a major plant design, Andy's client was required to carry out an alarm review. Andy advised the control, process and operations engineers on the project of current good practices for process alarms, particularly regarding prioritisation, and assisted in the initial review. They commented that this would result in an alarm system that was quite different to those they had experienced in the past but quickly understood the logic and started to see the benefits. The end result was a relatively small number of high prority alarms, with more medium and low priorities, and a significant number assigned to 'journal.' This compared to an initial allocation where the vast majority of alarms were to be assigned high priority, which would have inevitably resulted in a high workload and distraction for operators. Although a significant undertaking, the project proved that an alarm review was achievable and manageable. | ||
| 2007 Review of an organisational change | ||
| Gas | ||
The client was planning a significant organisational change. Referring to the HSE's staffing assessment methodology, but tailoring it to the client's specific needs, Andy considered the plans and employees' views. From this he was able to identify that there was nothing fundamentally wrong with the objectives, but that some of the arrangements for implementing the change needed to be reviewed. | ||
| 2007 Human factors for a control room at a new facility | ||
| Liquefied natural gas | ||
The client was building a new facility, which was to include a new control room. Andy was asked to comment on the engineering contractor's design. He identified a number of deficiencies and was able to advise on how current good practices could be incorporated. He was subsequently asked to provide more detailed advice on the operator interfaces in the control room. He conducted a task analysis workshop with the future operators of the plant. From this he was able to specify requirements for overview and detailed graphics; including task and scenario based displays where appropriate. As well as using the analyses carried out by Andy in the design of their user interfaces, the operators continued to carry out additional task analyses using the same method as they found it a very valuable exercise in reviewing the plant design and considering how they were to operate the plant in the future. | ||
| 2007 Human Hazop for a new plant | ||
| Liquefied natural gas | ||
The client was in the process of building a liquefied natural gas (LNG) storage facility. As part of its development of a safety report under the COMAH regulations, a human Hazop was carried out. This followed the principles of Hazop, applied to key human activities using a modified set of key words. Because of his knowledge of human factors and LNG facilities he was asked to participate in the Hazop. | ||
| 2007 Human factors during Front End Engineering Design (FEED) | ||
| Gas, power | ||
The client was carrying out Front End Engineering Design (FEED) for a decarbonised fuel power station. The plant would reform natural gas to create hydrogen and carbon dioxide, which would be reinjected into depleted gas wells to achieve sequestration. Being a radically new concept, the client wanted to ensure all good practices were followed throughout the design, including human factors. Andy was given the role of identifying key aspects of the plants future operation. He identified the critical tasks, analysed them and specified requirements for plant design, control systems, user interfaces, procedures and training. The project contributed to the client's development of an internal human engineering standard and was nominated for a corporate award for safety innovation. | ||
| 2007 Human factors analysis of systems for evacuation, escape and rescue | ||
| Offshore gas | ||
Following a major incident on an offshore platform the client identified a number of human errors that had occurred during evacuation, escape and rescue. Andy was asked to carry out a human factors analysis of the systems in place, taking into account the events that occurred during this incident. He visited the platform in order to observe arrangements and talk to key personnel. He then completed a task and error analysis. From this Andy made a number of recommendations for improving procedures, training and equipment arrangements. | ||
| 2007 Human factors engineering at project 60% design review | ||
| Gas | ||
Having completed 60% of the design for a major new plant, a review of the three dimensional model of the plant was carried out. This was attended by representatives of the design contractor, construction contractor, client and future operator. Andy's role was to provide specialist human factors engineering input, advising on potential conflicts between the proposed plant layout and human factors good practice; and suggesting feasible solutions. Shell's Design and Engineering Practice (DEP) on human factors engineering was used throughout this project, and in fact this was one of the first major projects where this had been the case. | ||
| 2007 Review of human factors following detailed design | ||
| Offshore gas | ||
Three offshore gas platforms had been designed and were in the early stages of construction. Previously, during Front End Engineering Design (FEED) a preliminary human factors engineering analysis had been carried out using Shell's Design and Engineering Practices (DEP). Andy was asked to carry out a human factors review at the end of detailed design. This involved a three day workshop attended by representatives of the design contractors and the future operating company during which the key systems and critical tasks were identified and analysed. Andy's report confirmed adherence to the DEP and other good practice; and recommended a number of actions to improve the design. | ||
| 2007 COMAH safety management system | ||
| Food and drink | ||
The client was planning to significantly increase the quantity of highly flammable material being stored on site. This would make it a Top Tier establishment under the COMAH regulations. Andy's role was to specify requirements for developing the company's safety management system required to demonstrate major hazard risks were as low as reasonably practicable. This involved discussions with the Competent Authority and analysis of the company's activities. Andy developed a specification that identified what systems and procedures the client needed to develop in order to satisfy the requirements of COMAH. This specification was written in a way that could be included in the COMAH safety report as a description of how the company manages its major hazard risks. | ||
| 2007 Review of shift handover systems | ||
| Oil products distribution terminals | ||
One of the conclusions from the inquiry into the Buncefield oil storage depot explosions and fire was that organisations must have effective shift handover arrangements. Andy was asked to review arrangements at two of the client's sites to determine if they were suitable and sufficient. He was provided with copies of logs, handover procedures and audit findings; and had informal discussions with personnel. Comparing with available guidance he concluded that the existing system were too informal and ad hoc, and so needed improving. However, he recognised that no problems were identified with the way handovers were actually carried out in practice, and so was able to recommend that the action required was to largely formalise existing arrangements rather than generate a new system. | ||